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LIST OF PARTIES
Parties in the trial court included CBS Outdoor, Inc. ("CBS"), National
Advertising Company ("National") (collectively "Appellees"), and Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford, dba Val-Dev, L.L.C. (the "Crawfords").

1
SLC 119776.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

4

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

5

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW

5

C. STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

CONCLUSION

15

19776 1

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C, 2001 UT 20, \ 14, 20 P.3d 388

13

CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, U 20, 24 P.3d 966

14

Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, L.L.C, 2006 UT App 352,110

13

Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, | 15, 28 P.3d 1271

12

Nolan v. Hoopiiana, 2006 UT 53, f 19, 144 P.3d 1129

4

State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f 15, 108 P.3d 710

4

State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^ 11, 52 P.3d 1257.... 4, 12, 13
Sycamore Family L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass'n, 2006 UT App 387,
12, 145 P.3d 177
4
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23

17

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2)

4, 14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25

4, 15,17

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26

4, 15, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002)

QT r

11Q776 1

4

3

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err by dismissing the Crawfords' Complaint on the basis that the

applicable statutes of limitation had run? The trial court's decisions regarding the proper
statute of limitations is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Nolan v.
Hoopiiana, 2006 UT 53,119, 144 P.3d 1129; State v. Green. 2005 UT 9, % 15, 108 P.3d
710. The trial court's determination of whether a statute of limitations has expired also is
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Huntington-Cleveland
Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^f 11, 52 P.3d 1257. In reviewing such decisions, appellate
court's accept the appellant's factual allegations and construe all reasonable inferences
drawn from those allegations in a light most favorable to the appellants. See Sycamore
Family L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass'n, 2006 UT App 387, ^ 2, 145
P.3d 177.
III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2). See Addendum.

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. See Addendum.

C.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. See Addendum.

SLC 119776 1

4

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a lease (the "Lease") which allowed Appellees to construct and
maintain an outdoor advertising sign (the "Sign") on real property located at
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the
"Property). The Crawfords contend that Appellees breached the lease and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interfered with the Crawfords' economic
relationships, were unjustly enriched, trespassed on the Property, and committed an
unlawful detainer.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW

The Crawfords filed their complaint on August 31, 2006. R. 1-9. The Crawfords
filed an amended complaint on September 31, 2006. R. 10-17. Appellees filed a motion
to dismiss on the basis that the applicable statutes of limitations had run. R. 20-26. After
oral argument, Judge Frank G. Noel orally granted Appellees' motion. On February 16,
2007, Judge Vernice Trease signed the written order memorializing Judge Noel's oral
order. R. 105-106.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In December 1974, National entered into the Lease. R. 39-40. Brad Crawford
purchased the Property under a general power of attorney on behalf of his parents, the
Crawfords, who succeeded to the lessor's interest under the Lease. R. 28. He paid a
premium because of the outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. Id.
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According to paragraph 3 of the Lease, the Lease commenced on February 1, 1975
and continued for ten years. R.39, f 3. Paragraph 3 further provides that it continued for
an additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the lessor
on any subsequent Lease anniversary upon at least sixty days written notice. Id.
Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides:
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or
remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the
Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the
Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy
of the building permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home
Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the
Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease
beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its displays
within the 90 day period.
R. 40, K 9.
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified
National that they were developing the Property and that National must remove the Sign.
R. 28. As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed the Sign. Id. On that date, the
Crawfords sent National a second letter demanding removal of the Sign. Id. The
Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building permit authorizing the development of the
Property. Id. As of August 7, 1996, National still had not removed the Sign. Id. On that
date, the Crawfords sent a third letter, demanding removal of the sign. R. 28-29. At that
time, although they were not required to do so, the Crawfords enclosed a copy of the site
plan for the development. R. 29.
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On November 25, 1996, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, and to avoid any
argument that the Lease had not been terminated, Martin S. Tanner, the Crawfords5
attorney at the time, notified National and its attorney in writing that the Lease would be
terminated as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. Id. This
notification gave National 67 days notice of termination.
Before terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an
application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the
Property. R. 29. Murray City granted the Crawfords' application an issued a permit for
the Crawfords to erect their own sign (the "Crawfords' Permit") on March 29, 1996. Id.
The Crawfords' Permit was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25, 1996. Id.
However, on September 3, 1996, pursuant to Murray City's custom, practice and policy,
Murray City extended the initial 180-day period by an additional 180 days, thereby
extending the validity of the Crawfords' Permit to March 24, 1997. Id.
On September 10, 1996, National represented to Murray City that the Lease would
not expire during the initial 180-day life of the Crawfords' Permit. Id. Relying on
National's representation, Murray City rescinded the Crawfords' Permit. Id. Murray City
then learned that removal of the Sign and construction of the Crawfords' sign could occur
within the extended-validity period of the Crawford's permit under Murray City's
September 3, 1996, extension. Id. Thus, Murray City reinstated the Crawfords' Permit.
Id.
On August 5, 1996, Murray City issued a second permit to National ("National's
Permit") which authorized National to erect a sign within 500 feet of the site authorized

7

by the Crawfords' Permit. R. 30. Murray City's zoning ordinances prohibit off-premise
advertising sign construction within 500 feet of another off-premise advertising sign. Id.
The signs authorized by both the Crawfords' and National's permits are "off-premise
signs" and if constructed according to their permits, would be within 500 feet of each
other. Id.
National applied for its permit on April 30, 1996. Id. The Crawfords applied for
their permit on March 5, 1996, and the Crawfords' Permit was issued on March 29, 1996.
Id. Thus, at the time Murray City issued National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid
permit that precluded the issuance of National's Permit. Id. Because Murray City zoning
ordinances preclude the simultaneous existence of both permits, only one permit could be
legally valid.
In October of 1996, National sued for a declaratory judgment that its permit was
valid. R. 30. On December 6, 1996, before the Crawfords had been made parties to the
lawsuit, the trial court granted summary judgment for National and ruled that the
Crawfords1 Permit was invalid. R. 42-43. The Crawfords' subsequent Motion to
Reconsider was denied. R. 30. Later, National added the Crawfords as defendants by
amendment and sought injunctive relief. Id. Once parties, the Crawfords requested
summary judgment validating their permit. Id. The motion was denied. Id.
Thereafter, the trial court granted National's second motion for summary
judgment, relying on its initial rulings on the prior motions. Id. This Court reversed that
ruling in June of 1999. Id. The case was remitted on August 9, 1999. Id.
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After remand, the Crawfords filed a second motion for summary judgment to
validate their permit. R. 31. National cross-moved for summary judgment. Id. In a
minute entry dated January 13, 2000, the trial court granted the Crawfords' motion and
denied National's motion. R.45. However, the trial court never entered an order to this
effect. R.31. Rather, in a minute entry dated February 16, 2000, after National objected
to the proposed order, the Court vacated its January 13, 2000 minute entry to determine if
service of process had properly occurred prior to the court's entry of summary judgment
against the Crawfords in December 1996. R. 48. The trial court did so to address
National's argument that the Crawfords had been properly served, that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the Crawfords prior to its December 1996 ruling and, therefore, that the
December 1996 ruling (which was reversed by this Court) was appropriate. R. 31.
The trial court granted the Crawfords' subsequent motion for summary judgment
on the issue of service of process. Id. This done, on August 28, 2000, the trial court
entered an order granting the Crawfords' second motion for summary judgment on their
counterclaim and denying National's cross-motion. R. 51-53. This was the first time the
court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was valid.
However, that validity did not last. National appealed the court's April 28, 2000
order. Id. On December 6, 2001, this Court reversed, holding that summary judgment
was precluded by issues of fact regarding service of process. R. 55-57. In doing so, the
Court observed that "[sjhould the trial court find that service of process was not
effectuated upon the Crawfords, [National's] claim necessarily fails." R. 57.
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After remand, the trial court held a trial on the issue of service of process. The
parties stipulated this was the "sole issue to be determined at trial." After considering the
evidence, the trial court found that service of process was not effectuated on the
Crawfords. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment
and Order (the "Order") on August 2, 2002. R. 59-62. Consistent with this Court's
December 6, 2001 observation that National's claim "necessarily fails," the trial court also
dismissed National's complaint, entered judgment for the Crawfords on their
counterclaim, and again ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was valid. Id.
National appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on October 9, 2003. R. 64-65.
This was the first time the validity of the Crawfords' Permit was conclusively established.
However, the Crawfords' could not take any further action in the trial court until this
Court remitted the matter. This did not happen until December 12, 2003.
On December 23, 2003, the Crawfords filed a Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, in which they requested leave to amend their
answer and assert a counterclaim for damages resulting from National's breach of the
Lease. The trial court granted the motion and, on October 19, 2004, held a trial. At that
time, the trial court entered judgment for the Crawfords, concluding that National had
breached the lease, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that, as a
result of that breach, the Crawford's had been precluded from entering into a subsequent
lease and had been damages in an amount exceeding $100,000. R. 71-75.
National appealed. This Court reversed. R. 77-87. In doing so, the Court found
that: (1) in addition to filing a motion for leave to amend, the Crawfords should have
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filed a motion to re-open the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 or 60; (2) such a motion
had to be filed within 10 days of August 2, 2002 under Rule 59, or within three months of
August 2, 2002 under Rule 60; (3) because the Crawfords did not file their motion for
leave to amend until December 23, 2003, it was untimely even if the Court construed it as
a simultaneous motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60; and (4) therefore, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant the Crawfords' motion for leave to amend. Id.
Importantly, this Court did not discuss the merits of the Crawfords1 claims. Nor
did it find, or even purport to find, that the Crawfords could not bring their claims in a
subsequent and independent action because of statute of limitations problems. In fact,
this Court did not even address applicable statutes of limitations. Id.
The Crawfords filed their complaint on August 31, 2006, and their amended
complaint on September 31, 2006. R. 10-17; 20-26. The initial complaint and the
amended complaint are referred to hereinafter collectively as "the Complaint." The trial
court granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, finding that the applicable
statutes of limitations had run. R. 105-106. The Crawfords appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. R.107, 111-15.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim to which that statute

applies has accrued. A claim accrues when it becomes remediable in the courts. A claim
is not remediable until the plaintiff can prove all essential elements, including damages.
The Crawfords' were damaged because National's conduct precluded them from
erecting a sign and collecting rent. However, the Crawfords could not erect a sign or
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collect rent without a valid permit. Thus, until the Crawfords' Permit was validated, they
were not legally entitled to damages in the form of lost rent.
In other words, the Crawfords5 claims against National did not accrue until their
permit was validated. This happened at the earliest on August 2, 2002 (when the trial
court first found the Crawford's Permit valid) or at the latest on October 9, 2003 (when
this Court affirmed that ruling). Either way, the Complaint was filed prior to the
expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations.
VI.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
The statute of limitations on a claim does not begin to run until that claim has

accrued. See State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^ 17, 52 P.3d
1277. A claim accrues when "it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the claim
is in such a condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is
established." Id. ^f 24 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In other words, a claim
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.
See Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, f 15, 28 P.3d 1271. Thus, a statute of limitations does
not begin to run until all the elements that must be proven by the plaintiff at trial "are
existing and may be established." Huntington, 2002 UT 75, f 24.
National did not remove the Sign as required by the Lease. Instead, it applied for
and obtained a competing permit. Because the two competing permits were within 500
feet of each other, National's conduct prevented the Crawfords from erecting their own
sign and collecting rent from advertisers. The Complaint seeks to recover this lost rent.
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However, the Crawfords could not bring their claims until they could first prove
they were legally entitled to collect rent. They could not collect rent until they first
erected a sign, which required a valid permit. Thus, until their pemiit was validated, the
Crawfords were legally entitled to damages from National for the lost rent. See
Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 352, ^f 10 ("A breach of
contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which is damages"); id., f
18 ("Without proof of actual damages [a plaintiff cannot] sustain a present cause of
action for breach of contract [and a court may] grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendant"); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,1f 14, 20 P.3d 388 ("The
elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance
by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4)
damages")
Consequently, the Crawfords' claims were not "in such a condition that the courts
[could] proceed and give judgment" to the Crawfords until the trial court ruled that the
Crawfords'Pemiit was valid. Huntington, 2002 UT 75, Tf 24. Prior to that time, the
element of damage that the Crawfords had to prove at trial was not "existing" and could
not be "established." Id. Thus, as a matter of law, the statutes of limitation on the
Crawfords claims did not begin to run until a court issued a ruling validating the
Crawfords' Permit. Id.
That happened on August 28, 2000, at the earliest. On that date, the trial court
entered an order ruling that the Crawfords' Permit. R. 51-53. This was the first time the
trial court made such a ruling.
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However, National appealed and this Court reversed. R. 55-57. Thereafter, on
August 2, 2002, the trial court again entered an order validating the Crawfords' Permit.
R. 59-62. This was the first time the trial court issued a ruling validating the Crawfords'
Permit that was not reversed.
Again, National appealed. This Court affirmed on October 9, 2003. R. 64-65.
This was the first time the validity of the Crawfords' Pemiit was conclusively established.
In light of the foregoing, the statutes of limitation on the Crawfords5 claims
began to run on August 2, 2002, at the earliest (when the trial court first found the
Crawford's Permit valid) and October 9, 2003, at the latest (when this Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling). Accordingly, the statute of limitation on the Crawfords1 claims for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
expired, at the earliest, on August 1, 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2)
(establishing a six-year limitation period on claims for breach of a written contract); CIG
Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, f 20, 24 P.3d 966 (holding that the six year statute
of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) applies to claims for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the implied covenant is founded on
a written contract). The Complaint was filed on August 31, 2006.
In sum, the Crawfords' claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant were timely filed.1 Thus, the trial court erred when it dismissed the Complaint

Additionally, if this Court finds, as it should, that the statutes of limitation did not
begin to run until October 9, 2003, when the validity of the Crawfords' Permit was
conclusively established for the first time, the limitation period applicable to the
Crawfords' claims for interference with economic relationships and unjust enrichment did
SLC 119776.1
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on the basis that the applicable statues of limitation had run. The trial court's dismissal
of the Complaint should be reversed.
VII.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Crawfords respectfully requests that this Court

reverse the trial court's Order Granting Motion to Dismiss.
Dated October 22, 2007.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C

By:^
Steve K. Gordon
Michael S. Malmborg
Attorneys for Appellants
Gene V. and Sherry T. Crawford

not expire until October 8, 2007. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (establishing a four
year limitation period for tort claims). Further, the limitation period applicable to the
Crawfords' trespass claim did not expire until October 8, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-26 (establishing a three year limitation period for trespass claims).
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property —
Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22; and
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged
on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment
is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25,
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to
one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when waste or
trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause
of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting such waste or trespass;
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific
recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time of its loss has a
recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without
the owner's fault, the cause does not accme until the owner has actual knowledge of such
facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by
the defendant;
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in such
case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake;

1n

(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation
is prescribed by the statutes of this state;
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action
does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm
suffered.
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